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New Products Development (NPD) is very important for companies. Two 
different kinds of new products are developed in the same time by companies, they try 
to find the balance between the radical and the incremental innovation products 
development, to find the most suitable product portfolio. NPD by longitudinal 
alliances is better than by individual enterprises in the operational management, 
resource base theorpy, as well as the risk control and so on. What’s more, there are 
imitate threaten all over the markets which may change the coordination mechanism 
of the longitudinal alliance of NPD. Therefore, the paper studied the coordination 
contract for both radical and incremtal innovation products development’s 
longitudinal alliance to make the compony can gain more profits because of 
advertages of the longitudinal alliance, based on the market which contains the imitate 
threaten. The coordination contracts can make the alliance improve the success rate of 
product development, maintaining a competitive advantage because of NPD. The 
paper established the Pure Revenue Sharing Contract as well as the Mixed Revenue 
Sharing Contract based on cost-sharing mechanism for radical innovation product 
development, and established the Pure Wholesale Price Contract as well as the Mixed 
Wholesale Price Contract based on the product development task shared mechanism 
for the incremental innovation product development, the studies showed that: 
(1)Leading time of the imitation of radical innovation product is longer than 
incremental innovation product. In the same time, the result showed that the 
competitor will gain more additional profits when the alliance developed the radical 
innovation product rather than the incremental innovation product. Therefore, if the 
competitor has ability to make its profitable, the rate of chosing imitation strategy will 
be higher when the alliance developed the radical innovation product. Longitudinal 
alliances of product development can through increasing marketing investments / 
efforts to resist the imitation, delay the time of introduction to the market of imitate 
















profits coming from the imitation strategy. 
(2)When the longitudinal alliance developed the radical innovation product, 
There are the feasible range of revenue-sharing ratio to make the Pure Revenue 
Sharing Contract can achieve the longitudinal alliance Pareto improvement, and 
Mixed Revenue Sharing Contract can achieve coordination of the vertical alliances, 
basing on the the market which exist imitate threaten. What’s more, if the aim of 
alliance is to delay the time of introducing the imitate product or when the costs of 
marketing is high, the mix revenue sharing contract based on the Mechanism of 
(Product research and development costs are shared, Marketing costs are shared) 
showed the better performance on the coordination of longitudinal allicance. In the 
same time, pure and mix Revenue Sharing Contract both can reduce the negative 
effects of the imitation to the alliance. 
(3) When the longitudinal alliance developed the incremental innovation product, 
both pure and mix Wholesale Price Contract can achieve the Pareto improvement of 
the incremental innovation product longitudal alliance under the imitate threaten. 
What’s more, the Mix Wholesale Price Contract perforemanced better than the pure 
one, and have the wider range of wholesale price commitment’s feasible interval. 
Forther more, both pure and mix Wholesale Price Contract both can reduce the 
negative effects of the imitation to the alliance. 
Keywords: Imitate Threaten; New Product Development; Longitudinal Alliance; 


















第一章 绪论 ............................................. 1 
1.1 选题背景 ...................................................... 1 
1.2 国内外文献综述 ................................................ 3 
1.3 论文的研究内容、结构以及方法 ................................. 13 
第二章 模仿威胁下新产品开发纵向联盟协调机制相关理论基础 . 16 
2.1新产品及新产品分类 ........................................... 16 
2.2创新者及横向竞争者的竞争博弈分析 ............................. 18 
2.3新产品开发纵向联盟 ........................................... 22 
2.4新产品开发纵向联盟关注的协调重点 ............................. 24 
2.5不同协调机制对新产品开发纵向联盟协调的影响 ................... 30 
2.6两类新产品开发的最适纵向联盟协调机制选择 ..................... 34 
本章小结 ......................................................... 36 
第三章 两类新产品开发横向竞争者的最优战略选择 ........... 37 
3.1基本模型 ..................................................... 37 
3.2激进式创新产品开发横向竞争者最优战略选择 ..................... 43 
3.3渐进式创新产品开发横向竞争者最优战略选择 ..................... 48 
3.4 两类产品开发下横向竞争者战略选择对比分析 ..................... 55 
本章小结 ......................................................... 57 
第四章 模仿威胁下激进式创新产品开发纵向联盟协调机制设计 . 59 
4.1基本模型 ..................................................... 60 
4.2单纯收入分享契约 ............................................. 69 
4.3基于产品开发成本分担的混合协调机制 ........................... 87 
本章小结 ........................................................ 103 
第五章 模仿威胁下渐进式创新产品开发纵向联盟协调机制设计 104 
5.1基本模型 .................................................... 105 
















5.3基于产品开发任务分配的混合协调机制 .......................... 132 
本章小结 ........................................................ 146 
第六章 结论与展望 ..................................... 148 
6.1 主要结论 .................................................... 148 
6.2 研究展望 .................................................... 151 
参考文献 .............................................. 153 
致  谢 ................................................ 159 
















Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction  ····································· 1 
1.1 General Background ··············································1 
1.2 Literature Review  ···············································3 
1.3 Research Question, Architecture and methods ·························13 
Chapter 2 Impact of Marketing Channel Choice on Supply Chain 
Architecture ·············································· 16 
2.1 New Product and Classification of New Product ·······················16 
2.2 Competitive Game Analysis of Innovator and Competitor ················18 
2.3 New Product Development Longitudinal Alliance ······················22 
2.4 Key Coordination Problem of NPD Longitudinal Alliance ···············24 
2.5 The Effect to NPD Longitudinal Alliance by Different Coordination Mechanism
 ·································································30 
2.6 The Appropriate Coordination Mechanism Choosing for two Kinds of NPD ·34 
Summary ·························································36 
Chapter 3 Competitor Strategy Decision under two Kinds of NPD 37 
3.1 Basic Model ···················································37 
3.2 Competitor Strategy Decision under Radical Innovation Product development43 
3.3 Competitor Strategy Decision under Incremental Innovation Products 
Development ························································48 
3.4 Contrast Analysis of Competitor Strategy for two Kinds of Innovation Product
 ···································································55 
Summary ·························································58 
Chapter 4 Mechanism Design of Radical Innovation Product 
Development Longitudinal Alliance Coordination under Imitate 
Threaten ················································· 59 
4.1 Basic Model ···················································60 
4.2 Pure Revenue Sharing Contract ····································69 
















Chapter 5 Mechanism Design of Incremental Innovation Product 
Development Longitudinal Alliance Coordination under Imitate 
Threaten ················································ 104 
5.1 Basic Model ··················································105 
5.2 Pure Wholesale Price Contract ···································· 117 
5.3 Mixed Coordination Mechnism Based on Product development Task sharing132 
Summary ························································148 
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Extension ························ 149 
6.1 Main Conclusions ··············································149 
6.2 Research Extension ·············································152 
Reference ··············································· 154 
Acknowledgements ······································· 160 






































    产品需求预测
    消费者预期
    产品概念
    测试改进
    投放
    推广
单个产品开发过程
改进的核心技术





































游供应商一起开发高利润的打印机。IBM、Sony 和 Toshiba 组成联盟，结合 IBM
























Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
